Busting graft: Tone from the top is key; How can CEOs build and sustain a graft-free corporate culture in today’s business environment?

http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/views-from-the-top/busting-graft-tone-from-the-top-is-key

Busting graft: Tone from the top is key

26 January 2015

Business Times Singapore

THIS WEEK’S TOPIC: How can CEOs build and sustain a graft-free corporate culture in today’s business environment? Continue reading

Ghost employees and vanishing finances; Indian bureaucrats, some may argue, are second to none in devising newer methods of corruption

http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/edit/ghost-employees-and-vanishing-finances.html

Ghost employees and vanishing finances

Joginder Singh

26 January 2015

The Pioneer

India, Jan. 26 — Drawing salaries in the name of workers who have never worked, and issuing subsidies to folks who died many years ago, are just a few of the many ways in which public servants steal from the state exchequer. Indian bureaucrats, some may argue, are second to none in devising newer methods of corruption. Irrespective of the legal definition of corruption practised by public servants, the de facto meaning is this: Get as much money and as many favours as possible for doing just regular work. However, be careful not to get arrested or lose your job (even though the latter is rare). Continue reading

[Flashback] Tesco accounting scandal Q&A: what happens next?

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/epic/tsco/11113002/Tesco-accounting-scandal-QandA-what-happens-next.html

Posted by CHEN Liting, Year 3 undergrad at the School of Business, Singapore Management University

Related: [Flashback] Tesco shares could plunge to 140p amid jitters over lengthy fraud probes (Link); Directors are still not properly policing corporate dangers; Tesco Faces Fresh Accounting Investigation; Auditor PWC Gets Unseasonal Greetings for Tesco and Barclays Roles (Link); Study of audit committees shows slow progress on monitoring accounts and risks; Tesco’s accounting issues have highlighted the role of directors in spotting problems (Link)

Tesco accounting scandal Q&A: what happens next?

Tesco shares have fallen by 10pc after warning that profits have been overstated, but there could be worse to come

By Graham Ruddick

10:58AM BST 22 Sep 2014

What exactly has Tesco found?

Dave Lewis, the Tesco chief executive, says he has discovered that profits for the six month to the end of August were overstated by £250m due to the “accelerated recognition of commercial income and delayed accrual of costs”. In other words, Tesco has been paying suppliers later and taking monies from them earlier than it should have. Given that £250m represents roughly a quarter of profits, this suggest the practice was widespread in its UK business. Tesco has launched an investigation into the blackhole. Continue reading

Proposed Draft Legislation on VIE Structures

Posted by CHEONG Wen Quan, Year 2 undergrad at the School of Business, Singapore Management University

Brief Summary

VIE structures are used by foreign companies to circumvent the ban on foreign ownership of sensitive Chinese assets. However, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce recently revealed a draft legislation that could change the way how Chinese regulators look at VIE structures. The main change focuses on who has control over the VIE rather than ‘ownership’. Eg. A VIE will be deemed to be foreign if foreign investors are in control (eg. >50% voting power) over the assets of the respective restricted sectors. Therefore, enough proof must be given to show that Chinese individuals or corporations have a majority control over the VIE, if not they will still be treated as foreign companies. The proposed rules may help reduce uncertainties for companies using the VIE structure as the foreign investors can now directly own parts of the Chinese assets.

Personal View

If this is passed, foreign investors may want to move out of a VIE structure. However, under the current VIE structure, Chinese individuals/owners technically own 100% of the assets in the VIE and are only bounded by contractual agreements between the foreign investors and themselves. Will the reluctance to give up this ownership act as an incentive and a catalyst for a sudden new wave of frauds to occur?

http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/01/22/how-chinas-new-vie-rules-might-play-out/

How China’s New Foreign Investment Rules Might Play Out Continue reading

[Flashback] Asian fraud detection systems market estimated to grow to $268.0 million by 2018

http://www.wattpad.com/83643565-fraud-detection-market-in-asia-industry-trends

http://www.whatech.com/market-research-reports/press-release/consumer/37891-new-report-looks-into-asian-fraud-detection-systems-market-that-is-estimated-to-grow-to-268-0-million-by-2018

http://www.digitalmarket.asia/ozone-media-partners-with-fraud-detection-company-forensiq/

Posted by Latha Do NADARAJAN , Year 3 undergrad at the School of Accountancy, Singapore Management University

New report looks into Asian fraud detection systems market that is estimated to grow to $268.0 million by 2018

The Asian Fraud Detection Systems report defines and segments the concerned market in Asia with analysis and forecast of revenue. The fraud detection systems market in Asia is estimated to grow to around $268.0 million by 2018, at a CAGR of 5.5% from 2013 to 2018. Continue reading

[Flashback] India Seeks to Overhaul a Corporate World Rife With Fraud

http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/15/india-seeks-to-overhaul-a-corporate-world-rife-with-fraud/?_r=0

Posted by GOH Shu Qi, Year 3 undergrad at the School of Accountancy, Singapore Management University

MUMBAI, India — In the wake of global scandals involving kickbacks and accounting fraud, one unlikely country, India, is aiming to set a tone in overhauling its corporate oversight laws. This month, the nation’s upper house of Parliament passed the Companies Bill, 2012, sweeping legislation meant to overhaul auditing, impose stiffer penalties for fraud and create more government oversight of businesses. The lower house had passed the bill last year. Once India’s president, Pranab Mukherjee, signs it into law, it will replace India’s 57-year-old corporate legislation that critics say had failed to keep up with changes in business practices.

India, a nation notoriously rife with graft and bribery, was partly motivated to pass the legislation in the wake of an accounting scandal that has been called India’s Enron. In 2009, B. Ramalinga Raju, the chairman of a prominent outsourcing company, Satyam Computer Services, confessed to overstating company assets and earnings by more than $1 billion, and then resigned. The fact that one company could defraud shareholders of such a large sum despite regular audits made painfully obvious the need for greater oversight in corporate India. But some four years after that startling case, little change in corporate laws had taken place until now. Continue reading

Management Motive, Weak Governance, Earnings Management, and Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Malaysian Evidence

http://eds.a.ebscohost.com.libproxy.smu.edu.sg/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=ac03be2a-1c9c-4391-b6fa-e0985566033f%40sessionmgr4004&vid=4&hid=4111

Posted by M Laavanya, Year 3 undergrad at the School of Accountancy, Singapore Management University

Management MotiveWeak GovernanceEarnings Management, and Fraudulent Financial ReportingMalaysian Evidence.

Hasnan, Suhaily1 Abdul Rahman, Rashidah2 Mahenthiran, Sakthi3

Journal of International Accounting Research. 2013, Vol. 12 Issue 1, p1-27. 27p. 1 Diagram, 8 Charts.

Abstract:

This study examines ten factors associated with fraudulent financial reporting (FFR) in Malaysian publicly listed companies. We hypothesize that three factors proxy for management rationalization, four factors proxy for management motives, and three factors proxy for the opportunity to commit fraud. Our sample consists of 53 fraud firms convicted of securities fraud and 53 no-fraud firms, all of which were listed on the Bursa Malaysia and have a complete set of data from 1996-2007. With regard to rationalization, we find that prior violations and founders on the board are positively and significantly associated with FFR. With regard to motive, we find that financial distress is positively and significantly associated with FFR while family ownership is negatively and significantly associated with FFR. Our opportunity for fraud proxies, multiple directorships, and audit quality are positively and significantly associated with FFR. Additionally, we find evidence of earnings management in the years leading up to FFR.

The Visual Story Of Bre-X, The Biggest Fraud In Gold Mining History

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-01-23/visual-story-biggest-fraud-gold-mining-history

The Visual Story Of The Biggest Fraud In Gold Mining History

Tyler Durden on 01/23/2015 21:01 -0500

Courtesy of Visual Capitalist

This infographic documents the rise and fall of Bre-X.

bre-x Continue reading

[Flashback] Beanie Babies Vs Vendor Financing: Can the ‘Product’ (and Asia) Stand On Its Own? Revisiting Off-Balance Sheet Receivables in Chinese Construction Machinery Companies

Excerpts from “Beanie Babies Vs Vendor Financing: Can the ‘Product’ (and Asia) Stand On Its Own?, July 2012 edition in On the Ground in Asia publication by KB Kee 

Is this happening in America or Asia? All day long, people are charging in and screaming, “Which Beanie Baby do you have today?” Tempers flared as long lines forms for the stuffed toys, sold along with a Happy Meal, which were the cause of many fights. Theft of toys was prevalent at the height of their popularity and there was an active secondary second-hand market for them after the promotion.

The Beanie Babies craze from 1996-2000 caused Warren Buffett to be cautious in McDonald’s, one of the most recognizable brand names in the world. Yet, McDonald’s is not one of the core buy-and-hold stocks in Berkshire’s holdings, as explained by Buffett in a talk to MBA students in 1998:

“People don’t want to be eating – exception to the kids when they are giving away Beanie Babies or something – at McDonald’s every day. If people drink five Cokes a day, they probably will drink five of them tomorrow… I like the products that stand alone absent price promotions or appeals although you can build a very good business based on that.”

  • Warren Buffett, October 1998

As China slows down, the classic quote of Buffett becomes increasingly relevant: “It’s only when the tide goes out that you learn who’s been swimming naked.” When everyone is enjoying good times, you don’t know who has taken on excessive risks. And multibagger opportunities present themselves to the diligent value investors who have been monitoring closely the few swimmers with unique, scalable business models run by farsighted outstanding entrepreneurs as they distinguish themselves from the weaker companies reliant on “Beanie Baby” incentives to push sales of products that might not be able to “stand alone” and at the expense of their balance sheet. This “Beanie Baby” incentive practice is increasingly being questioned in varied industries, from shipyards, construction and telecom equipment to property, autos and retail.

Emboldened by attractive Beanie-Baby-like vendor financing and generous credit terms with zero downpayment provided by construction equipment companies, buyers of these machines have been very aggressive in their purchases, resulting in China to account for 60% of worldwide concrete consumption, bubbling far above the so-called “concrete scowl”.

There are concerns that these buyers, which include debt-laden and cash-strapped property developers, are using the machines as collateral for further loans. Analysts at Jefferies in HK, who were reported by the media this month to have travelled to Jiangsu province to study the concrete market, said that more than half of the concrete machines sold by a prominent Chinese construction equipment company had not even been switched on and were lying idle in storage. In our “On the Ground in Asia” March 2011 edition, we mentioned that one Asian top manager shared with us how his MNC counterpart in China told him that they might not be able to sell any new equipment in China this year. He thought his MNC friend was joking to him until he was told the reason for the pessimism was because two-thirds of the machines sold were not turned on as indicated by the GPS tracking signal. Industry executives are reported to be talking of a “collapse” and are looking to export their way out of trouble via acquiring overseas companies and setting up overseas factories, often used as fronts for more loans.

In the case of the construction machinery industry, the accounting bent in us also noted how the sellers of these machines have not recorded these vendor financing activities on the balance sheet and do not have proper bad debt provisions on the corresponding ballooning off-balance-sheet receivables despite the fact that banks require them to guarantee loan/lease payments in the event of customer defaults. These off-balance sheet receivables, estimated to be connected to around 30% of total sales in the industry, should be treated as debt on the liability side since it is the same as the machinery companies incurring a debt and then selling the machines to customers on credit. The cashflow from operations that come from this vendor financing activity should be re-categorised as cashflow from financing, which would turn most of these companies to be running negative cashflow positions in the last four years.

Since the loss amount on a loan default is the difference between the outstanding loan and the residual value of the machine that can be salvaged, and most of the financing consider the equipment as collateral, the second-hand market is important in understanding the scope of loss. In North America, the fair market value (FMV), orderly value (OLV) and forced liquidation value (FLV) of used equipment were around 75%, 64% and 54% of the equipment costs, respectively, generally in line with the write-off ratio of 40% on average.

The second-hand machine market in China, however, is much less mature than that in the developed countries. Domestic machinery manufacturers‟ single-minded focus on new machine sales and lack of refurbishing capabilities also hurt the value of second-hand machines. Most machines can only be sold at around 30-40% of the original price when they are three year-old. Yet, the loss rate of these receivables reported at the machinery companies are less than 1%, much lower than the 40% write-off ratio on average at say Caterpillar’s financing receivables.

It is likely that many repossessed machines were sold internally within the company and became part of its operating lease fleet, consequently hiding the net impact on P&L. It is now very prevalent for dealers to give their customer cash advance to avoid towing back of equipment and reflected in the default rate for the machinery companies. We are cautious whenever we hear from bullish analysts and promoters about how machinery and cyclical companies are “cheap” on a price-to-book historical valuation basis.

Managing the Balance Sheet with Operating Leases; Fims investigated by the SEC or DOJ for financial misrepresentation exhibit high levels of unexplained operating leases

Click to access CFS_managing_August7%202012.pdf

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2114454

Managing the Balance Sheet with Operating Leases

Kimberly Rodgers Cornaggia American University – Kogod School of Business

Laurel Franzen Loyola Marymount University

Timothy T. Simin Pennsylvania State University
July 19, 2012

Abstract: 
We test whether firms use the off balance sheet (OBS) treatment of operating leases in order to strengthen their balance sheets. We find that firms’ lease versus buy decision has changed over time. Time series evidence suggests that firms and industries not expected to have traditional economic benefits of leasing are increasingly financing with operating leases. We infer that such firms use operating leases to expand OBS debt capacity and we explore their incentives to report conservative balance sheets. We find that (1) OBS leasing allows firms to better manage debt covenants limiting debt or capital expenditures (2) unexplained OBS leasing is diminished by scrutiny of institutional investors and (3) firms investigated by the SEC or DOJ for financial misrepresentation exhibit high levels of unexplained operating leases.