Short interest and stock price crash risk; the relation between short interest and crash risk is driven by bad news hoarding and is more salient for firms with weak governance mechanisms, excessive risk-taking behavior, and high information asymmetry between managers and shareholders

http://www.sciencedirect.com.libproxy.smu.edu.sg/science/article/pii/S0378426615002204

Journal of Banking & Finance Volume 60, November 2015, Pages 181–194

Short interest and stock price crash risk

Jeffrey L. Callena, Xiaohua Fangb, , 

Highlights

  • We find evidence that short interest is positively related to future crash risk.
  • The evidence is in line with the view that short sellers detect bad news hoarding.
  • Additional findings show that the relation is more salient for specific subsamples.
  • Empirical support is provided for the main relation observed above.

Abstract

Using a large sample of U.S. public firms, we find robust evidence that short interest is positively related to one-year ahead stock price crash risk. The evidence is consistent with the view that short sellers are able to detect bad news hoarding by managers. Additional findings show that the positive relation between short interest and future crash risk is more salient for firms with weak governance mechanisms, excessive risk-taking behavior, and high information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Empirical support is provided showing that the relation between short interest and crash risk is driven by bad news hoarding.

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Willingness to manipulate earnings helps individuals succeed in corporate accounting, according to a new academic study.

http://www.pymnts.com/in-depth/2015/the-corporate-culture-of-earnings-manipulation/#.Vc2FKvmqpBc

Study Links Earnings Manipulation to Success in Corporate Accounting

Michael Cohn

10 August 2015

Accounting Today Online

Willingness to manipulate earnings helps individuals succeed in corporate accounting, according to a new academic study. The study’s authors contend that individuals who ascend to positions of authority in corporate accounting are predisposed by their personality and values to manage earnings and are hired and promoted for that very reason.

Continue reading

Controlling Shareholder Entrenchment, Investor Protection, and Firm Cash Holding: Chinese Experience

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2565058

Controlling Shareholder Entrenchment, Investor Protection, and Firm Cash Holding: Chinese Experience

Xiaoran Ni Tsinghua University – School of Economics & Management
February 14, 2015
Asian Finance Association (AsianFA) 2015 Conference Paper

Abstract: 
This paper shows that agency problems result from controlling-minority shareholder conflicts have a nonlinear causal relation with firm cash holding, and this relation hinges critically on the strength of investor protection. Using a direct measure of controlling shareholder’s entrenchment behavior, our theoretical work in a two-period static model and empirical analysis using Chinese financial data during 2000-2013 shows that the relation between controlling shareholder tunneling and cash holding is significantly U-shaped, and this relation is more significant with stronger investor protection. Also, The inflation point of the U-shape is inversely propotional to the strength of investor protection, which is smaller with stronger investor protection. In general, our findings reinforce the importance of informal investor protection mechanisms in mitigating agency problems and affecting firms’ cash policies in an emerging markets with undeveloped legal systems.

Even Fraud-Savvy Investors Often Look for the Wrong Red Flags

Even Fraud-Savvy Investors Often Look for the Wrong Red Flags

29 June 2015

M2 Presswire

New research identifies the types of investors who are vigilant about corporate fraud, but finds that most of those investors are tracking the wrong red flags – meaning the warning signs they look for are clear only after it’s too late to protect their investment. The work was performed by researchers at North Carolina State University, George Mason University, the University of Virginia and the University of Cincinnati.

“Individual investors get hurt if they own stock in fraudulent companies that cook the books, such as Enron,” says Dr. Joe Brazel, a professor of accounting at NC State and lead author of a paper on the work. “But we wanted to know how investors think about fraud and whether they try to protect themselves.” Continue reading

Mismatched regulatory regimes, How Chinese reverse mergers – and China MediaExpress – evaded scrunity through regulatory conflicts and loopholes

http://www.nyujlb.org/wp-content/uploads/nyb_11-2_397-438_Teng.pdf

http://seekingalpha.com/article/677421-the-complete-list-of-small-cap-chinese-companies-on-the-nyse

Kevin QuonInvesting in the Lives of Others (648 clicks)

The Complete List Of Small Cap Chinese Companies On The NYSE

Jun. 22, 2012 7:52 AM ET  |  Includes: BORNCEAICHCCHINACMMCOCYDDANGDGWIYDLEJGUJKSLDKMDTNPDNTPSOLSTPSTVTSLWHWXXINXUEYGEZAZX Continue reading

A Buddhist Parable About Accounting Irregularities: Monkey and Centipede

We shared this story of the Monkey in the Buddhist book Journey to the West.. he had to overcome various obstacles with the team in the journey of knowledge and education, including the powerful Centipede who had a thousand eyes that shone on Monkey, searing him very badly.. Badly hurt, he sought the help of Goddess of Mercy who directed him to Mother Hen god fairy who in turn passed him a special gift/weapon: the Needle. When the Centipede uses the thousand eyes again when they meet, Monkey uses the Needle which worked its way by poking the thousand eyes.

From the Buddhist interpretation to the book Journey to the West, this story is about how when we are accused and bullied by a powerful person who would use all sorts of diversionary tactics and scrutiny (eyes and mouths) to destroy us, the only way is the Needle, which stands for the Truth in public.

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Consider this: A company uses cash to buy government bonds, subsequently depositing the bond in a bank, a seemingly very harmless transaction. Is this potential accounting fraud?

What is undisclosed is this company, Olympus, colluded with the LGT bank manager to use the bond as a collateral to lend to two shell companies created by Olympus. These shell companies then use the borrowed money to acquire toxic assets at cost from Olympus, thus allowing Olympus to avoid recognizing impairment losses on these underwater securities should they be marked to market in both the immediate period and in the long-term. Continue reading