China Taisan Technology (SES: F2X, Bloomberg: CTSAN): Auditor’s Emphasis of Matter on RMB604.8M Onerous Sales Contracts; Income Statement Impact = -RMB560.8M, Impairment Loss on Trade Receivables = RMB60.9M, Provision for Loss for Sales Contract = RMB165.6M

Posted by: Desmond LIN Liye and KB Kee

Related post: (1) China Environment: Auditor Emphasis of Matter raises more questions on potential accounting tunneling risk, (2) China Environment FY2014: Significant Deterioration in Receivables Collectability And No Provision for Impairment, (3) Open Letter to SGX/MAS: Reply to CFO of SGX-Listed China Environment (CENV SP) on report “Potential Accounting Tunneling Fraud at China Environment?” – Address the accounting and governance concerns in an SGX/MAS announcement, (4) Does Auditor Explanatory Language in Unqualified Audit Reports Indicate Increased Financial Misstatement Risk? “Emphasis of matter” language predicts restatements

Audit firm: ‘Possible irregularities’ in Scanwolf Corp Bhd in the company and some of its subsidiaries in the property development division

http://www.thestar.com.my/Business/Business-News/2015/05/07/Audit-firm-Possible-irregularities-in-Scanwolf/?style=bizAudit firm: ‘Possible irregularities’ in Scanwolf

Thursday, 7 May 2015

KUALA LUMPUR: PKF Covenant Sdn Bhd, which Scanwolf Corp Bhd appointed on April 23 to conduct an investigative audit of the group, has highlighted in its preliminary findings “possible irregularities” in the company and some of its subsidiaries in the property development division.

Continue reading

Hewlett-Packard unveils details of $5bn Autonomy fraud case

http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/may/05/hewlett-packard-unveils-details-of-5bn-autonomy-case

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financial-crime/11583498/HP-claims-Mike-Lynch-sacked-Autonomy-finance-boss-to-silence-concern-over-sales.html

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/35db8c1e-ef2d-11e4-87dc-00144feab7de.html#axzz3ZKz9hlwC

HP’s lawyers have outlined five main sources of allegedly wrongly claimed income:

  • $194m of supposedly hidden hardware sales. HP said it found Autonomy resold hardware such as servers made by other companies, often at a loss, and claims its directors allowed investors to believe this was software revenue.
  • $196m in apparently wrongly reported sales of Autonomy’s core software product, IDOL, to other software companies.
  • $205m in supposedly questionable transactions with software resellers.
  • $80m of claimed incorrectly reported hosting deals, in which Autonomy renegotiated contracts to host other companies’ data on its own servers
  • $33m in other alleged improper transactions.

Hewlett-Packard unveils details of $5bn Autonomy fraud case

US firm claims Mike Lynch inflated revenues by $700m, but Autonomy founder says HP has failed to produce ‘smoking gun’

Of particular interest to Hewlett-Packard are 37 deals with small IT contractors that bought Autonomy’s software. Photograph: Jim Young/Reuters

Juliette Garside

Tuesday 5 May 2015 19.54 BSTLast modified on Wednesday 6 May 201500.10 BST

Hewlett-Packard has unveiled full details of its $5bn (£3.3bn) fraud case against the founder of the UK software company Autonomy, claiming that Mike Lynch inflated the revenues of his business by about $700m over a two-and-a-half-year period.

HP, which bought Autonomy in 2011 for $11bn, has filed a claim against Lynch and his finance director, Sushovan Hussain, in the high court in London, alleging they engaged in improper transactions with software resellers and in questionable accounting practices. Continue reading

The strange case of Ashazi: Wirecard in Bahrain, via Singapore

http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/05/05/2127886/the-strange-case-of-ashazi-wirecard-in-bahrain-via-singapore/

The strange case of Ashazi: Wirecard in Bahrain, via Singapore

Dan McCrum

| May 05 10:10 | 2 comments | Share

Ashazi Services, a Bahrain-based electronic payments company, moved from place to place in the Gulf Kingdom. For a time it was based in managed office space in one of the gleaming towers of Manama’s prestigious diplomatic area, but also small apartments far from the centre.

In early 2011, however, Ashazi’s address was the office of its lawyer, Kumail Al Alawi, found above a side alley tucked between an outpost of Kentucky Fried Chicken and a car rental office.

So what sort of company was it? The question matters because in 2011 the Bahrain start-up was responsible for €4m per year of licence fee revenues reported by Wirecard, the German listed payments company. Ashazi Services Co WLL is one of the dormant companies leading back to E-Credit Plus Singapore, the first business purchased in Wirecard’s long Asian acquisition spree. Continue reading

Ire-Tex Corp Bhd auditors give qualified opinion due to impairment of related-party receivables and advances

http://www.thestar.com.my/Business/Business-News/2015/05/06/IreTex-auditors-give-qualified-opinion/?style=biz

Ire-Tex auditors give qualified opinion

Wednesday, 6 May 2015

By: WONG WEI-SHEN

UPETALING JAYA: The external auditors of Ire-Tex Corp Bhd have expressed a qualified opinion on the company’s financial statements for the year ended Dec 31, 2014. The light-emitting diode (LED) manufacturer’s auditors UHY said the basis for its qualified opinion was due to trade receivables from sales, which were subsequently impaired as of Ire-Tex’s financial year end.

During the year, UHY noted that Ire-Tex’s unit Zoomic Automation (M) Sdn Bhd sold goods to two related parties amounting to RM5mil. The trade receivables amounting to RM5mil and advances of RM800,000 were subsequently impaired by the management as of financial year end.

“Due to insufficient appropriate audit evidence, we are unable to satisfy ourselves as to the validity and existence of these sales and whether there were other consequential adjustments to be made to the accompanying financial statements including cost of sales and gross profit,” said UHY in a statement. Continue reading

Origins of Chinese Bond Default Buried in Accounting Footnotes

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-05/origins-of-kaisa-default-in-china-sought-in-accounting-footnotes-i9bv09mr

Origins of Chinese Bond Default Buried in Accounting Footnotes

byLisa PhamMichelle YunLianting Tu

May 6, 2015

Investors still wondering how Kaisa Group Holdings Ltd. doubled its debt in six months and triggered China’s first property bond default may want to read page 63 of its 2014 interim report.

There, in footnote No. 15 of the Shenzhen-based company’s balance sheet, is a reference to 11 billion yuan ($1.8 billion) in advance deposits for property projects from third parties and for 1.15 billion yuan that needed to be refunded.

At issue is whether these deposits were initially classified properly as current liabilities on Kaisa’s books. Analysts at Lucror Analytics Pte, Mitsubishi UFJ Securities HK Ltd. and BDO Ltd. say the payments have characteristics of interest-bearing debt, and booking them the way Kaisa did may have made metrics that investors use to assess a company’s riskiness appear stronger than they actually were. Continue reading

Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firm

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.libproxy.smu.edu.sg/doi/10.1111/1475-679X.12071/epdf

Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

JOSEPH D. PIOTROSKI1, T. J. WONG2and TIANYU ZHANG2

Journal of Accounting Research

Volume 53Issue 2pages 405–459May 2015

ABSTRACT

This paper tests the proposition that politicians and their affiliated firms (i.e., firms operating in their province) temporarily suppress negative information in response to political incentives. We examine the stock price behavior of Chinese listed firms around two visible political events—meetings of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and promotions of high-level provincial politicians—that are expected to asymmetrically increase the costs of releasing bad news. The costs create an incentive for local politicians and their affiliated firms to temporarily restrict the flow of negative information about the companies. The result will be fewer stock price crashes for the affiliated firms during these event windows, followed by an increase in crashes after the event. Consistent with these predictions, we find that the affiliated firms experience a reduction (an increase) in negative stock return skewness before (after) the event. These effects are strongest in the three-month period directly preceding the event, among firms that are more politically connected, and when the province is dominated by faction politics and cronyism. Additional tests document a significant reduction in published newspaper articles about affected firms in advance of these political events, suggestive of a link between our observed stock price behavior and temporary shifts in the listed firms’ information environment.

The Invisible Hand of Short Selling: Does Short Selling Discipline Earnings Management?

http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org.libproxy.smu.edu.sg/content/28/6/1701.full.pdf+html

Rev. Financ. Stud. (2015) 28 (6):1701-1736.

The Invisible Hand of Short Selling: Does Short Selling Discipline Earnings Management?

Massimo MassaBohui ZhangHong Zhang

Abstract

We hypothesize that short selling has a disciplining role vis-à-vis firm managers that forces them to reduce earnings management. Using firm-level short-selling data for thirty-three countries collected over a sample period from 2002 to 2009, we document a significantly negative relationship between the threat of short selling and earnings management. Tests based on instrumental variable and exogenous regulatory experiments offer evidence of a causal link between short selling and earnings management. Our findings suggest that short selling functions as an external governance mechanism to discipline managers.

Stock manipulation: Rudraksh Cap-Tech

http://www.moneylife.in/article/stock-manipulation-rudraksh-cap-tech/41462.html

Stock manipulation: Rudraksh Cap-Tech

4 May 2015

Moneylife

With just around 250 retail shareholders, the share price of Rudraksh Cap-Tech shot up a stupendous 1182% in just a year

Rudraksh Cap-Tech (earlier known as Jolly Leasing & Finstock) deals in financial services. Though ostensibly it has a varied list of service offerings, no details of contracts undertaken, contract values or even the number of clients are mentioned either on the website or the annual report. Over the past seven quarters (June 2013 to December 2014), it has generated revenues of just about Rs2 lakh-Rs3 lakh each quarter. Net profit averaged just around Rs60,000 each quarter. This did not hamper trading in the stock which has only 242 retail shareholders. The share price shot up a stupendous 1182%, to Rs85.90 in April 2015, from Rs6.7 in May 2014. In the nine-month period, from 6 May 2014 to 12 February 2015, the stock was consistently hitting the upper circuit, rallying 1400% to Rs100 from around Rs7. Since then, trading has been volatile. In March 2015, the stock had an average trading volume of Rs23 lakh a day, up from about Rs2,000 a day in May 2014. Rudraksh was hauled up several times in the past for regulatory non-compliance issues, but no strict action has ever been taken against the management. Will this blatant price manipulation go unnoticed as well?

More than a fifth of an estimated 250 mainboard-listed stocks trading below 20 cents have proposed consolidations to comply with the Singapore Exchange’s new rule aimed at curbing speculation and market manipulation

http://www.pressreader.com/singapore/the-straits-times/20150505/282415577845006/TextView

Firms act to meet new 20-cent rule

Grace Leong

5 May 2015

The Straits Times

Over one in 5 SGX counters trading below that amount consolidating their shares

MORE than a fifth of an estimated 250 mainboard-listed stocks trading below 20 cents have proposed consolidations to comply with the Singapore Exchange’s new rule aimed at curbing speculation and market manipulation here.

Introduced on March 2, the new Minimum Trading Price (MTP) rule of 20 cents a share takes effect on March 1 next year. The year’s grace period gives firms time to get their six-month average share price above 20 cents. Continue reading