http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.libproxy.smu.edu.sg/doi/10.1111/jbfa.12078/abstract

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting

Volume 41, Issue 7-8, pages 831–866, September/October 2014

Relationship Networks and Earnings Informativeness: Evidence from Corruption Cases

Joseph P.H. Fan, Feng Guan, Zengquan Li and Yong George Yang^†,*

Abstract

The measurement difficulties arising from relationship-based business transactions can result in accounting opacity. We test this hypothesis by exploiting a natural experiment. Using a sample of firms that were networked with 45 high-level Chinese bureaucrats involved in corruption scandals between 1996 and 2007, we examine the patterns in the earnings informativeness of these firms before and after the exogenous break of the networks. We predict that the costs and benefits of business-politics relationships, which are not measurable by the current accounting systems, diminish the ability of accounting earnings to track a firm’s economic performance. In turn, a break in a political relationship due to anti-corruption enforcement reduces the measurement noise and improves the earnings informativeness. We find that, relative to the matched control firms, there is indeed a significant increase in the earnings informativeness of the networked firms following the public exposure of a scandal. Robustness tests fail to show that the documented improvement in the earnings informativeness is primarily due to systematic changes in the firms’ earnings management behavior or disclosure policies.

http://eds.a.ebscohost.com.libproxy.smu.edu.sg/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=931db4eb-27a9-43fa-8853-4fe219e9ee30%40sessionmgr4003&vid=0&hid=4113

Journal of Business Ethics

January 2015, Volume 126, Issue 1, pp 3-19

Is Tone at the Top Associated with Financial Reporting Aggressiveness?

Lorenzo Patelli, Matteo Pedrini

Abstract

The discussion about the relationship between tone at the top and financial reporting practices has been primarily focused on the oversight role played by the board of directors and other structural elements of corporate governance. Another relevant determinant of tone at the top is the corporate narrative language, since it is a fundamental way in which the chief executive officer (CEO) enacts leadership. In this study, we empirically explore the association between financial reporting aggressiveness and five thematic indicators capturing different traits of ethical leadership from 535 annual letters to shareholders. We find that aggressive financial reporting is positively associated with CEO letters using a language which is resolute, complex, and not engaging. Our empirical findings highlight the importance of examining discretionary corporate narratives for the auditing process and the role of tone at the top in influencing accounting practices.

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joms.12093/abstract

http://ejournals.ebsco.com.libproxy.smu.edu.sg/Direct.asp?AccessToken=8UPPPPOV0FU430OFJY0WUTX41J0FV0YO9P&Show=Object

Looking Attractive until You Sell: Earnings Management, Lockup Expiration, and Venture Capitalists

Dae-il Nam^1,*, Haemin Dennis Park²and Jonathan D. Arthurs³

Journal of Management Studies

Volume 51, Issue 8, pages 1286–1310, December 2014

Abstract

Earnings management occurs when managerial discretion allows managers to influence reported earnings and thus mislead some investors about the underlying economic performance and quality of the firm. This study considers how potential investors may guard against earnings management by observing negative stock price reaction at the lockup expiration period of initial public offering (IPO) firms as a negative signal. Findings from a sample of 160 newly public firms show that earnings management behaviour is stronger in IPO firms backed by venture capitalists (VCs). Moreover, VC reputation negatively moderates this relationship such that IPO firms backed by reputable VCs are less likely to manage earnings, suggesting that reputable VCs serve an auditing function following an IPO. Overall, we provide insights into signalling theory by examining negative signals arising from the behaviour of multiple agents in an IPO firm.

http://www.sciencedirect.com.libproxy.smu.edu.sg/science/article/pii/S1042444X14000474#

Journal of Multinational Financial Management

Volume 28, December 2014, Pages 62–78

Mutual funds’ holdings and listed firms’ earnings management: Evidence from China ^☆

Jing Chi^a, , , Jingjing Yang^b, 1, , Martin Young^a, c, 2, 

Highlights

• Chinese long-term mutual funds’ holdings have an insignificant impact on accruals.
• Chinese short-term funds’ holdings encourage an increase in earnings management.
• Long- or short-term funds impact different earnings management measures differently.
• Funds’ impact on earnings management is stronger in non-state-controlled firms.

Abstract

This study examines the impact of long-term and short-term mutual funds’ ownership on various types of earnings management in China. We find that both long-term and short-term funds’ holdings can lead to reduced non-core income. However, long-term mutual funds’ holdings have an insignificant impact on accrual items, while short-term funds’ holdings encourage an increase in accruals. The positive influence of short-term funds’ holdings on accruals is much stronger than their negative impact on non-core income. Finally, we find the impact of mutual funds’ holdings on earnings management is much stronger in non-state-controlled listed firms than that in state-controlled ones.