Seven resignations, two sackings and two suspensions on board of troubled Birmingham International; In January, Birmingham announced that HK$38 million was suspected to have been misappropriated by an unnamed former employee and Hong Kong police were investigating the matter

http://www.scmp.com/print/business/companies/article/1734042/seven-resignations-two-sackings-and-two-suspensions-board

Seven resignations, two sackings and two suspensions on board of troubled Birmingham International

Tuesday, 10 March, 2015, 9:20am

Toh Han Shihhanshih.toh@scmp.com

carson_david_wong

Carson Yeung was jailed for six years in March last year.

Seven directors of Birmingham International Holdings, including the chairman and chief executive, resigned on Monday, two directors were sacked and two directors were suspended, the Hong Kong-listed firm announced on Tuesday. The massive shake-up came a day after it was reported that imprisoned money launderer Carson Yeung Ka-sing had called an extraordinary general meeting of Birmingham International, which owns English soccer team Birmingham City. The receivers are conducting an investigation into the affairs of the company Continue reading

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Independent Directors’ Dissent on Boards: Evidence from Listed Companies in China

Posted by Eugene SAY Gui Hua, Year 4 undergrad at the School of Business, Singapore Management University

Eugene: As we ask ourselves this week whether whistleblowing works in Asia, research has found that even at a supervisory board level (equivalent to Board of Directors) in China, directors are not as ‘independent’ as they are deemed to be.  The research has found that directors are more likely to dissent when the board chair (most commonly, the dual-role CEO and Chairman of the company) has left the board. There is a 27% occurrence of dissent among departing directors who are due to leave the board in their last 60-days. Also, while directors with foreign experience are more likely to dissent, it is inconclusive that academics, accountants and lawyers are significantly more active in voicing dissent. Even in a situation of dissent, findings show that they dissenting directors tend to offer mild, subjective justifications and overt criticism of the management is rare. Lastly, while current literature suggests that dissent might be reflective of diverse viewpoints, which is beneficial to the firm, it has been found that  dissent is consequential to both the director and the firm.  For directors, dissent significantly increases one’s likelihood of exiting the director labor market, translating to a more-than-10% estimated loss of annual income. For firms, there is an economically and statistically significant cumulative abnormal return of -0.97% around announcement of dissent.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2252200&download=yes

Independent Directors’ Dissent on Boards: Evidence from Listed Companies in China

Juan Ma, Harvard Business School

Tarun Khanna, Harvard University – Strategy Unit

October 24, 2013

Harvard Business School Strategy Unit Working Paper No. 13-089

Abstract:

In this paper, we examine the circumstances under which so-called “independent” directors voice their independent views on public boards in a sample of Chinese firms. First, we ask why independent directors dissent, i.e. how they justify such dissent to public investors. We find that when independent directors dissent, they tend to offer mild, subjective justifications. Overt criticism of the management is rare. Next, we ask when an independent director is more likely to dissent and who is more likely to dissent. Controlling for firm and board characteristics, we find that dissent is significantly correlated with breakdown of social ties between the independent director and the board chair who locates at the center of the board bureaucracy in China. Dissent is more likely to occur when the board chair who appointed the independent director has left the board. Dissent also tends to occur at the end of board “games”, defined as a 60-day window prior to departure of the board chair or departure of the independent director herself. The endgame effect is particularly strong, seeing 27% of the dissent issued at board “endgames” which represents only 4% of independent directors’ average tenure. While directors with foreign experience are more likely to dissent, we do not find that academics, accountants and lawyers are significantly more active in voicing dissent. Lastly, we show that dissent is consequential to both the director and the firm. For directors, dissent significantly increases one’s likelihood of exiting the director labor market, which translates to a more-than-10% estimated loss of annual income. For firms, we document an economically and statistically significant cumulative abnormal return of -0.97% around announcement of dissent. Although the literature has suggested that dissent might be reflective of diverse viewpoints, and perhaps beneficial in and of itself through reduction of firm variability, we do not find this offsetting beneficial effect to be strong.

Noble’s Spat With Iceberg Highlights Barriers to Disclosure

http://www.wsj.com/articles/nobles-spat-with-iceberg-highlights-barriers-to-disclosure-1425932989

Posted by John SOH Yong Ye, Year 4 undergrad at the School of Economics, Singapore Management University

Noble’s Spat With Iceberg Highlights Barriers to Disclosure

Commodity traders become more open, but there are limits

Noble Group is a middleman in commodities markets. PHOTO: REUTERS

ANDREW PEAPLE

March 9, 2015 4:29 p.m. ET

Noble

HONG KONG—Once renowned for their secretive nature, companies that make billions of dollars shifting commodities around the world have been slowly emerging into the limelight in recent years. But a high-profile scrap between Hong Kong-based Noble Group Ltd. and Iceberg Research, a little-known research firm, has pointed up a persistent problem: It can be hard to tell how trading companies make their money. Continue reading